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A few empirically supported principles can account for much of the thematic content of
waking thought, including rumination, and dreams. (1) An individual’s commitments to
particular goals sensitize the individual to respond to cues associated with those goals.
The cues may be external or internal in the person’s own mental activity. The responses
may take the form of noticing the cues, storing them in memory, having thoughts or dream
segments related to them, and/or taking action. Noticing may be conscious or not. Goals
may be any desired endpoint of a behavioral sequence, including ﬁnding out more about
something, i.e., exploring possible goals, such as job possibilities or personal relationships.
(2) Such responses are accompanied and perhaps preceded by protoemotional activity or
full emotional arousal, the amplitude of which determines the likelihood of response and
is related to the value placed on the goal. (3)When the individual is in a situation conducive
to making progress toward attaining the goal, the response to goal cues takes the form of
actions or operant mental acts that advance the goal pursuit. (4) When circumstances are
unfavorable for goal-directed operant behavior, the response remains purely mental, as in
mind-wandering and dreaming, but still reﬂects the content of the goal pursuit or associated
content. (5) Respondent responses such as mind-wandering are more likely when the
individual is mentally unoccupied with ongoing tasks and less likely the more that is at
stake in the ongoing task. The probability of respondent thought is highest during relaxed
periods, when the brain’s default-mode network dominates, or during sleep. The article
brieﬂy summarizes neurocognitive ﬁndings that relate to mind-wandering and evidence
regarding adverse effects of mind-wandering on task performance as well as evidence
suggesting adaptive functions in regard to creative problem-solving, planning, resisting
delay discounting, and memory consolidation.
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INTRODUCTION
The basic thesis of this article is that the thematic content of
thoughts and dreams is determined, directly or indirectly, by the
individual’s goals. This article answers, as far as the current state of
research permits, the question of howwemay predict the thematic
content of what individuals will think or dream about at any given
moment in time, or how much they will think about something
over longer time periods.Will it be, for instance, about a particular
personal relationship, a problem at work, a religious quandary, a
political situation, fear of leading a life of failure, or competing for
a prize?Why will the mix be different for Person A than for Person
B? When is the individual most likely to think about a particu-
lar topic? If the thought is in the form of mind-wandering while
engaged in a task, to what extent is this a waste of time?
HISTORY AND SOME DEFINITIONS
Thematic content simply refers here to what the thought or dream
is about, irrespective of the form inwhich it occurs, whether verbal
or non-verbal, conceptual or imaginal, whether its representation
of the content is fairly veridical, metaphoric, symbolic, or asso-
ciated with the thematic content in some other discernible way.
These latter dimensions of form raise a host of other questions,
the answers to which have been little researched, are not as well
understood, and are not addressed in this article.
While people are working on speciﬁc tasks, much of their
mental content will, of course, relate to the momentary task.
However, even during such operant task activity, mental con-
tent commonly shifts intermittently to other, respondent content
(Klinger, 1971; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a), which has often
been dubbed daydreaming or mind-wandering.
Modern scientiﬁc research on such shifts in thought can be
considered to have begun in earnest with the experimental and
psychometric work of Jerome L. Singer and John S. Antrobus (e.g.,
Singer, 1966). The terms operant versus respondent are taken from
Skinner’s theory (Skinner, 1935, 1953) to refer to activity aimed
at acquiring reinforcers (or goals) versus reﬂexive responses to
stimuli, here including one’s own mental events.
Various investigators have applied varying operational deﬁ-
nitions to daydreaming, such as thought consisting of fanciful
content (Freud, 1953), being independent of current task activ-
ity (e.g., Singer, 1966), or being unintended and spontaneous,
i.e., respondent (Klinger, 1971). As it turns out, when assessed
by thought-sampling with participants’ self-reports and analyzed
intra-individually, these three deﬁnitions are almost orthogonal
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 415 | 1
“fpsyg-04-00415” — 2013/7/11 — 14:42 — page 2 — #2
Klinger Goals, thoughts, dreams: basic principles
(Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988). That is, where a thought scores on
any one of these dimensions provides almost no information as to
where it will score on either of the other two dimensions.
The easiest of these thought dimensions to operationalize is
independence from current tasks, also dubbed mind-wandering,
which constitutes between about a third and a half of wak-
ing thoughts (Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988; Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010a; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Mind-wandering
has in recent years attracted strong interest among cognitive
and neurocognitive researchers. Their work has greatly enriched
knowledge of mind-wandering.
EVOLUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS: WHAT GOOD IS
MIND-WANDERING?
What follows is shaped by two evolutionary considerations. First,
any kind of activity that absorbs up to a half of conscious brain
activity must have been selected for its contribution to the human
species’ survival. Indeed, it appears that the brain’s default-mode
network provides the substrate for mind-wandering (e.g., Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011b), a network of several “hubs” and“subsys-
tems”(Andrews-Hanna,2012) that probably constitutes amajority
of the brain’s energy consumption (Raichle, 2009). It must serve
important functions. These include a variety of mental processes,
including retrieval of past experiences and imagining future sce-
narios (Buckner et al., 2008), which are essential for planning and
are also stock components of mind-wandering sequences.
Raichle (2009) argues that the default-mode network is not
coextensive with conscious mind-wandering, citing the continua-
tion of the network’s activity into lighter states of anesthesia and
Stages 1 and 2 of sleep (Horovitz et al., 2008), when dreaming
is most frequent, and the demonstration (Christoff et al., 2009)
of executive-network elements during resting states. However,
if one accepts that there is continuity between mind-wandering
states and dreaming, and if one recognizes that non-conscious
processes (meaning-complexes; Klinger, 1971, 2011) underlie both
the thought and dream segments, there is no reason to doubt the
close relationship of mind-wandering and its variants with the
default-mode network.
There is increasing reason to believe that spontaneous, respon-
dent thought, as inmind-wandering andother formsof daydream-
ing, is continuous with night-dreaming, their different properties
being attributable to the different neurophysiological contexts in
which they operate – that is, a single round-the-clock stream of
mentation modulated by ﬂuctuations of brain states but without
sharp disjunctions in its phenomenology. There are dream-like
segments in waking states – in one study 25% of waking thought
samples were rated by participants as having at least a trace of
dream-like qualities (Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988), which agrees
approximately with other results (Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975;
Klinger, 1978–1979) – as well as there being waking-like cogni-
tive content in dreams. As indicated below, goal-related cues have
somewhat similar effects on the content of both waking thought
samples and dream samples obtained with night-time probes.
Some degree of continuity in waking and sleeping mentation has
been noted as well by others (e.g., Domhoff, 1996; Raichle, 2009;
Christoff et al., 2011). Given this apparent continuity, it seems
reasonable to consider both kinds of states together for purposes
of delineating principles governing their thematic content.
A second evolutionary consideration has to do with the fact
that succeeding in goal pursuits is, for the Animal Kingdom, a
categorical imperative. That is, all animal species at one ormore of
their life stages depend for their individual survival on successful
pursuit of the substances and conditions necessary for life – a
motile survival strategy. Furthermore, the survival of the species
depends on individuals successfully pursuing the goals necessary
for procreation.
It follows that every adaptation conferred on humans by the
natural selection that produces evolutionmust have evolved in the
service, direct or indirect, of successful goal pursuit. That would
include respondent mental activity, such as mind-wandering.
These two evolutionary considerations provide a backdrop for the
following ﬁve principles that account for much of the variance in
the thematic content of people’s thoughts.
(A deﬁnitional clariﬁcation: Goals may be any targeted end-
point of a behavioral sequence, such as food, sex, sleep, a paycheck,
an aesthetic experience, or ﬁnding out more about something, i.e.,
exploring potential goals, such as job possibilities or personal rela-
tionships. The brain’s processes underlying goal pursuit ﬁt the
conventional deﬁnition of motivation.)
PRINCIPLE 1: GOAL COMMITMENTS DETERMINE
ATTENTIONAL FOCUS, RECALL, THOUGHT AND DREAM
CONTENT, AND BEHAVIORAL FOLLOW-THROUGH
An individual’s commitments to particular goals sensitize the indi-
vidual to respond to cues associated with those goals. These cues
then receive automatic priority for cognitive processing. The cues
may be external in the environment or internal in the person’s
own mental activity and include cues related to failure to achieve
a goal (Chatard and Selimbegovic´, 2011, Study 6). The responses
may take the form of noticing the cues, storing them in memory,
having thoughts or dream segments related to them, and/or taking
action. Noticing may be conscious or not.
One’s personal goals also provide an important basis for orga-
nizing one’s thoughts, including thoughts about one’s future
(prospection), and introducing goal-related cues appears to facili-
tate this process (D’Argembeau and Demblon, 2012). People are
also more ﬂuent in making up scenarios around speciﬁc goals
than around speciﬁc persons or locations (D’Argembeau and
Mathy, 2011). These investigators, however, instructed their par-
ticipants to formulate scenarios about hypothetical future events.
The responses were not primarily the mind-wandering – spon-
taneous, undirected thoughts – on which the remainder of this
article will focus.
EFFECTS OF GOALS ON THOUGHT AND DREAM CONTENT
Early support for this view (Klinger, 1978; Hoelscher et al., 1981)
demonstrated effects of goals on attention, recall, thought content,
and dream content. Initial investigations of this model assessed
participants’ concerns (the state of having goals, both positive-
appetitive and aversive, as assessed there from extensive interviews
and questionnaires) and a fewdays later asked participants to listen
with moderate attention to what they were about to hear. The
experimenters then played for them simultaneously two different
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 415 | 2
“fpsyg-04-00415” — 2013/7/11 — 14:42 — page 3 — #3
Klinger Goals, thoughts, dreams: basic principles
but similar audiotaped 15-min narratives, one narrative to each
ear.
Throughout, participants could choose to which narrative they
listened. Here and there, at particular time points on this tape,
a few words going to one ear had been inconspicuously mod-
iﬁed to relate to one of the individual participant’s own goals,
and, simultaneously, a few words going to the other ear had been
modiﬁed to relate to someone else’s goals, but not, so far as one
could determine, to this participant’s goals. The two modiﬁed
passages in each such pair were matched on formal properties
and designed to be syntactically compatible with the words they
replaced. For example, for a participant who had the goal of enter-
ing a helping profession, the italicized words in the following
passagewere embedded intooneof thenarratives (original stream-
of-consciousness ﬁction, Texts for Nothing, by Beckett, 1995, p.
101): “Who are these people anyway? What do they need, what can
be given? Did they follow me up here...” The narrative passages
in which the modiﬁed portion related to the participant versus to
someone else varied quasi-randomly between the two narratives
within each session.
Participants used a toggle switch to indicate points in time at
which they switched the ear to which they were paying attention.
This indicated at any given time towhich narrative theywere prob-
ably listening. Ten seconds after the end of each modiﬁed passage,
the tape paused with a signal tone and participants reported what
they were thinking about and what last content they recalled from
the tape.
The results were powerful (Table 1): participants spent signif-
icantly more time listening to passages associated with their own
goals than to passages associated with others’ goals, recalled those
passages about twice as often, and had thought content that (by
ratings of judges blind to conditions) was related to passages asso-
ciated with their own goals about twice as often as to the opposite
passages (Klinger, 1978). The relatively small differences in time
spent attending to the own-goal-related cues versus other cues is
explainable by the fact that detecting such cues in an unattended
channel requires the process of noticing them after a portion of
the own-goal-related passage has already played, then switching
attention to that channel and moving the toggle switch.
When participants listened to tapes that had been prepared
for other participants, no effects on attention, recall, or thought
content occurred, indicating that the embedded cues indeed cor-
responded to the goals of the individual participants. The fact that
the cues were woven unobtrusively into their narrative contexts,
with no particular tasks to be performed with them, suggests that
they might have functioned in a way similar to unexpected envi-
ronmental cues or even cues presented by the individual’s own
internal stream of consciousness.
Similarly, goal-related stimuli inﬂuence dream content much
more reliably than do other stimuli. One investigation in a sleep
laboratory using standard electroencephalography (EEG) and eye
movement measures (Hoelscher et al., 1981) administered a mod-
iﬁed Concern Dimensions Questionnaire (CDQ; Klinger et al.,
1980, 1981) to assess seven participants’ goals, followed by four
consecutive nights, an adaptation night and three experimental
nights, during which, ﬁve to seven times per night during Stage
1-rapid eye movement (REM) or Stage 2 sleep, the experimenters
Table 1 | Cognitive responsiveness to concern-related versus
non-concern-related cues.
Dependent variable Types of cues Percent of intra-
subject variance
accounted for by
cue differences
Concern Non-
concern
Waking subjects
Time spent listening
(seconds)
74.6 58.9b 7.62
No. of passages per session
recalled
2.78 l.38c 17.06
Passages per session
thought about
3.73 1.95c 18.59
Sleeping subjects
Percent cues incorporated in
REM sleep
34 11a
Note. Data for waking subjects are from Klinger (1978), Table V, p. 252.
Signiﬁcance values are for the differences between concern-related and non-
concern-related means. The differences were tested by directional t-tests for
correlated data, with each session’s mean difference between Concern and Non-
concern conditions taken as the unit of analysis, adjusted to compensate for
differing numbers of sessions per participant. The data are based on 68 sessions
from 20 participants (17 for percent of variance), but because of a Behrens–Fisher
problem degrees of freedom used in signiﬁcance testing were the most conser-
vative number, 19 d.f. Data in the bottom row from seven sleeping participants for
59 stimulus trials during REM over three experimental nights are from Hoelscher
et al. (1981). REM, rapid eye movement sleep.
ap < 0.05, bp < 0.0005, cp < 0.0001.
played for them various taped words or phrases related to their
different goals or to other participants’ goals. Eight seconds after
each such stimulation, participants were awakened to orally report
their dream content, which was recorded. Judges blind to condi-
tion scored the reports for three types of thematic incorporation:
(a) direct mention of the stimulus, (b) mention by synonymous
language, and (c) metaphoric parallels or thematic similarities to
the CDQ descriptions of the concern or non-concern represented
by the stimulus. Pairs of raters agreed on incorporation judgments
94% of the time, compared to a chance agreement level of 67%
(F(73) = 3.42, p < 0.005). Dream reports resembled the imme-
diately preceding stimuli about three times as often if the stimuli
related to participants’ own goals than if they related to other
people’s goals (Table 1). These results are consistent with conclu-
sions drawn from an extensive review of the dream literature by
Domhoff (1996).
In these studies, comparing thoughts and dreams to stim-
uli played after the thoughts and dreams had already occurred
produced little resemblance, regardless of how goal-related the
stimulus was. Thus, the effect on thought and dream content was
clearly produced by the goal-relatedness of the stimuli that pre-
ceded the thoughts and dreams. That is, the state of having a goal –
i.e., a current concern about that goal – automatically gave processing
priority in the individual’s cognitive systems to cues associated with
that goal.
Another sleep study (Nikles et al., 1998) instructed 10 partici-
pants before they went to sleep to dream about a particular topic,
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which sometimes was related to one of their individual goals, as
assessed by a modiﬁed Short Motivational Structure Question-
naire (MSQ; Cox and Klinger, 2011) and sometimes it was related
to a different person’s goal. Participants spent four consecutive
nights in the laboratory: an adaptation night without awakenings,
a baseline night with awakenings but no dream suggestions, and
two experimental nights with the presleep suggestions. Half of
the participants received own-goal instructions on Night 3 and
instructions to dream about another’s goal on Night 4, with the
other half receiving the reverse order of instructions. The instruc-
tions to dream about topics that were related to participants’ own
goals signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced dream content (as rated by judges
blind to conditions), whereas instructions to dream about top-
ics related to others’ goals did not. These results indicated that
suggestions to dream about their own goals engaged participants’
attention, recall, and subsequent dream processing in a way not
found with suggestions to dream about other topics.
Additionally, although the rate at which own-goal-related
material appeared in dreams was lower during the baseline night,
when no dream topics had been suggested, than when they had
been suggested on an experimental night, dreaming related to own
goals was still signiﬁcantly more frequent (p< 0.01) than material
related to others’ goals, which rarely occurred. This parallels the
ﬁndings obtained with goal effects on waking thoughts, such as in
mind-wandering. The processing priority conferred by having a
goal – a current concern – continues to operate in dreams during
sleep.
The results of the suggestion nights also demonstrated that
dream content responded to sleepers’ presleep intentions, which
would appear difﬁcult for activation-synthesis theory to accom-
modate. The principal features of Hobson and McCarley’s (1977)
original formulation of activation-synthesis theory are that (a)
dream images are directly generated by essentially random, spo-
radic pontine discharges (the activation) that produce sudden
sensations, the dream hallucinations, and (b) forebrain activity
seeks to ﬁt these images into as coherent a pattern or plot as possi-
ble (the synthesis). There is also an extended version of this theory
(Seligman and Yellen, 1987) that adds an emotional component.
Although one could argue that goal-related associations might
be worked into the synthesis, neither formulation admits voli-
tional forces such as intentions into the array of determinants that
shape dreams, let alone an interaction of intentions with current
concerns.
Taken together, the ﬁndings described in this section indicate
the powerful effect that goal-related cues exert on thought ﬂow
in states that cannot be considered conducive to goal-directed
operant activity. The cues used in experiments with waking partic-
ipants (Klinger, 1978) were subtly embedded in spoken narratives
to which participants were simply instructed to listen with mod-
erate attention. For example, for a participant one of whose goals
was to enter a helping profession, an allusion to someone’s needs
was embedded in an otherwise irrelevant 15-min narrative played
to one ear, while simultaneously a cue considered unrelated to
the participant’s goals was embedded in another narrative played
to the other ear. Such cues could not have been interpreted as
discriminative stimuli for action. Similarly, the dream study by
Hoelscher et al. (1981) exposed certiﬁably sleeping participants
to cues relating to their goals, such as an experimenter speak-
ing the address of a boyfriend. The participants remained asleep
until awakened by the experimenters for their dream reports.
These results identify goal-related stimuli as one of the triggers
for individual mind-wandering and dream segments.
It is amatter of deﬁnition as to whether such segments could be
considered self-generated, given that the cues were external. How-
ever, internal cues from a person’s previous stream of mentation
might plausibly play a role similar to the external cues employed in
the above experiments. Insofar as that is true, it answers provision-
ally one of the questions raised by Smallwood (2013a) regarding
the determinants of when (“why”) self-generated thoughts begin:
exposure to goal-related cues.
The thoughts evoked by cues and those occurring naturally do,
of course, eventually end, and rather soon. Nobody has so far
devised a satisfactory method for assessing when naturally occur-
ring thought segments begin and end. The only method so far
available is to rely on participants’ retrospective self-reports, which
are bound to be fraught with error. However, a group of 20 par-
ticipants trained to estimate brief time lapses rated the durations
of the latest thought segments prior to probes, and of the seg-
ments just preceding those, in both laboratory settings and, for
12 of them, while living their otherwise normal daily lives. Their
median estimates of segment duration were 5 s in both settings,
with a mean of 9 s in the laboratory setting and 14 s outside the
laboratory (Klinger, 1978). These participants rated their conﬁ-
dence in their own estimates as “very conﬁdent” 64% of the time
and as “moderately conﬁdent”35% of the time. Pope (1977) asked
participants in a laboratory to signal with a key press every time
their mind shifted to a new topic, which happened on average
about 5 or 6 s apart. This agrees very approximately with our own
ﬁndings.
The implication is that mental content continually jumps from
goal-related topic to goal-related topic in brief segments that may
or may not return to the same topic as previous segments. A
very rough estimate provides the generalization that waking men-
tal activity over a 16-h day contains about 4,000 such thought
segments (Klinger, 1990).
INTERFERENCE STUDIES OF AUTOMATIC PROCESSING PRIORITY FOR
GOAL-RELATED CUES
The processing priority for goal-related cues has been shown using
a variety of other cognitivemethods. One is theuse of quasi-Stroop
procedures. In the classic Stroop procedure, under instructions to
name the color of the font of words displayed one at a time as
quickly as possible, participants typically respond more slowly
when the meaning of the word conﬂicts with the color, such as
green font for the word RED. Similarly, reaction times (RTs) in
reporting the font color of goal-relatedwords are typically on aver-
age longer than they are to non-goal-related words (Johnsen et al.,
1994; Riemann and McNally, 1995; Gilboa-Schechtman et al.,
2000; Fadardi and Cox, 2008) or images. Presumably, the own-
goal-relatedness of the word’s meaning grabs processing priority
over identiﬁcation of font color, thereby slowing reporting of font
color. This processing priority could readily account for the ten-
dency of consciousmental content inmind-wandering to gravitate
toward material related to the individual’s own goals. The stimuli
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for such shifts in content are presumably internal ones in the
individual’s own ongoing stream of thought.
W. Miles Cox and his colleagues have extended this work in
a variety of ways to consumers of alcohol. Recalling that goals
inﬂuence the focus of attention, it is no surprise that excessive
drinkers ﬁnd their attention drawn to alcohol cues. Instead of tar-
geting RT to words whose meaning conﬂicts with their font color,
these studies targeted words related to alcohol and compared RT
to the alcohol-related words with RT to emotionally neutral words
(Cox et al., 2000, 2006). Frequent drinkers were slower to name the
colors of alcohol-related words, and the amount of interference,
which is calculated as RT to alcohol words minus RT to neutral
words, is correlated with the amount of alcohol the participant
normally consumed in a week (Fadardi and Cox, 2008, 2009; This
effect was largely independent of participants’ overall executive
cognitive functioning).
This attentional bias is problematic for people who wish to
reduce their drinking (Cox et al., 2002; Fadardi and Cox, 2008),
at least partly because drink cues arouse the desire to drink.
Interestingly, Fadardi and Cox (2009) have worked out an inter-
vention, called the Alcohol Attention Control Treatment Program
(AACTP), for reducing excessive drinkers’ bias toward processing
alcohol cues. In this method, they attempted to counter the pro-
cessing priority of alcohol cues directly by training disattention to
them in successive Stroop exercises. The method both improved
color-naming RT and reduced participants’ alcohol consumption.
The reduction of alcohol consumption continued through a 30-
day follow-up period. It was evidently possible to reduce the
processing priority of the drinking goal and with it the status of
the goal itself.
The automatic character of this cognitive prioritizing was fur-
ther buttressed by data from a lexical decision task (Young, 1987).
Young’s participants were to indicate as quickly as possible by
pressing a button whether each occurrence of a letter string on
a computer screen was an English word. The left side of the
screen was taken up by a patch containing computer-related ver-
bal “garbage,” which participants were instructed to ignore (and
apparently did), but which sometimes contained a word related
to one of a participant’s current goals. When the target string was
indeed a word, this lexical judgment was slowed signiﬁcantly if the
distractor patch contained an own-goal-related word. Again, the
point here is that encountering cues related in some way to one’s
goals takes higher processing priority over competing cues in a
way that helps to explain the gravitation of undirected thought
content to one or another of the individual’s goals.
On the assumption that males are more likely than women
to be concerned with power and hence be drawn to its cues,
Mason et al. (2010) performed three experiments on responses
of men and women to high-power versus low-power cues. These
demonstrated that male participants dwelt longer on words rel-
evant to power than on neutral words, were more distracted by
high-power than low-power ﬂanker words (i.e., had longer RTs
to target stimuli), and were more likely to recall high-power-
related than low-power-related names. Female participants did
not display these biases of attention andmemory. These results are
consistent with those described above. Goal-related cues outrank
others in processing priority.
BRAIN FINDINGS RELEVANT TO GOAL EFFECTS ON COGNITIVE
PROCESSING
Recent brain-imaging studies have provided further support for
this conclusion. Ihssen et al. (2011) displayed single alcoholic
beverages and four other kinds of images while assessing brain
activity with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in light and
heavy drinkers. In contrast to the light drinkers, the heavy drinkers
responded in key cortical areas (right and left insula and ventral
striatum) signiﬁcantly more strongly than in response to neutral
stimuli. This is consistent with the behavioral evidence that alco-
hol cues strongly draw the attention of heavy drinkers, for whom
drinking is a frequent goal.
Consistent with these ﬁndings regarding the processing prior-
ity placed on cues related to goals, Franz (2012) has presented
a neuroscientiﬁc model of brain organization and development,
based largely on split-brain research, to support the conclusion
that attention is controlled by intended actions and, at higher lev-
els of organization, goals. He proposes “a multilevel system for
the allocation of attention for action, in which the dopaminergic
basal ganglia-thalamic-cortical circuits are integral.... Notably, the
present framework builds upon a highly dynamic system in which
subcortical processes are central to the networks involved” (p. 12).
Attention is thereby tethered to the brain systems responsible for
central motivational processes.
An impressive proportion of thought samples obtained dur-
ing mind-wandering have contained content that related to
the individual’s goals, including spontaneous planning elements
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a; Andrews-
Hanna, 2012). In a retrospective questionnaire following their
MRI sessions, participants using seven-point scales rated their
spontaneous thoughts on average at about a goal-relatedness
scale’s midpoint (4.16) and rated the thoughts’ personal sig-
niﬁcance above that (5.26); nearly half of these thoughts were
considered to have focused on the past (19%) or future (28%;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a). Their fMRI-based brain activity
correlations indicated that besides the more established com-
ponents of the default-mode network, such as the posterior
cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex, the medial tem-
poral lobe plays an important role in supplying material for
spontaneous thoughts from the individual’s past or prospec-
tive future (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a,b). Consistent with
these ﬁndings, Ellamil et al. (2012) found elevated activity
in the medial temporal lobes during generation of creative
ideas.
While arguing vigorously for the adaptive nature of the default-
mode network, Schacter (2012) observed that “in most studies
that have linked default network activity with simulation of future
experiences, the simulated future events are not linked to for-
mulating a plan, solving a future problem, or any other kind of
goal-directed cognitive activity. Instead, they represent imaginary
scenes or scenarios thatmight ormight not occur to the individual
within a particular future time frame.” Unorganized as they may
be, they serve up insights and planning components that can be
assembled later into adaptive plans and action, as suggested by the
incubation effect of experimentally induced mind-wandering in
improving creative problem-solving (Baird et al., 2012). See also
below under Principle 4.
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Christoff et al. (2009) (see also Christoff, 2012 for elaboration)
discovered that mind-wandering often includes an interweaving
of default-network activity with executive systems. One of the lat-
ter is the frontoparietal control network, which appears to couple
with the default-mode network during planning activity (Spreng
et al., 2010). This is consistent with the ﬁndings of autobiographic
planning during mind-wandering (Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011a) – presumably planning for action on one of the
participant’s goals.
PRINCIPLE 2: EMOTIONAL RESPONSES PROBABLY PLAY A
ROLE IN INITIATING AND ACCOMPANYING ATTENTION TO
GOAL-RELATED CUES
There are a number of reasons for believing that responses to
goal-related cues are accompanied and perhaps preceded by pro-
toemotional activity or full emotional arousal, the amplitude of
which determines the likelihood of response and is related to the
value placed on the goal. First, ratings of a cue’s goal-relatedness
are strongly correlatedwith ratings of emotional responses to those
cues. Second, goal-related cues arouse skin conductance responses
more dependably than do other cues, ameasure of arousal. Finally,
anticipated emotional responses to reaching a goal or to failure to
reach it are a measure of the goal’s value to the individual.
As a terminological note, “arousal” is here taken as a dimension
of emotional amplitude. From at least Wilhelm Wundt a century
ago to Lisa Feldman Barrett (e.g., Kuppens et al., 2012), arousal
(sometimes called activation), and hedonic valence (i.e., quality of
the emotional response being aroused) have been two fundamental
dimensions of emotion or affect. Sometimes, as in the literature
on skin conductance responses, the hedonic valence of the aroused
emotion is left unspeciﬁed.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTIONAL EVOCATIVENESS AND
GOAL-RELATEDNESS OF CUES
Regarding the association of emotional arousal with goal-related
cues, Bock and Klinger (1986) computed 85 participants’ intra-
individual correlations between two kinds of their reactions to 40
words: the word’s emotional “arousal potential” for them (“the
strength of the subject’s emotional reaction to the content of the
word”) and “the extent to which the word has to do with the
subject’s important concerns, problems, worries, or goals that
currently preoccupy the subject.” The two ratings were obtained
in two different phases of the experiment, separated by a dis-
tractor task. The mean intra-individual correlation between these
ratings was 0.45 (p < 0.0001). Partial replications of this rela-
tionship in unpublished data (E. Klinger, S. J. Perrine, E. S.
Goetzman, T. Hughes, M. Bock, U. Bowi) yielded similar intra-
individual coefﬁcients of 0.57, 0.63, 0.65, and 0.60 (all signiﬁcant
at p < 0.001).
AN INTERFERENCE STUDY
Using RT methods (Schneider, 1987), participants pressed but-
tons as quickly as possible to identify whether letters displayed one
at a time on the lower half of a computer screen were an X or a
Y. Participants were instructed to ignore distractor stimuli, many
of them words, that often appeared at a ﬁxation point above the
letters. After this procedure, subjects rated howmuch each distrac-
tor word aroused them emotionally. Letter identiﬁcation slowed
signiﬁcantly when the distractor words were rated as emotion-
ally arousing. That this effect really was attributable to something
emotional is supported by the fact that participants who scored
high on the Affective Intensity Measure (Larsen and Diener, 1987)
were slowedby emotionally arousing distractors signiﬁcantlymore
than other participants were.
SKIN CONDUCTANCE RESPONSES TO GOAL-RELATED CUES AND
ASSOCIATION WITH GOAL-RELATED THOUGHTS
Additional data on the relation of emotional arousal to goal cues
were obtained with skin conductance responses (Nikula et al.,
1993). In the ﬁrst of three experiments, 19 American participants
participated in two separate sessions. The ﬁrst session consisted of
completing the CDQ (Klinger et al., 1980), and the second session
on the following day involved electrodermal measurement during
taped stimulus presentations. These consisted of 84 three-word
clusters presented twice in two different random orders; for exam-
ple, “doctor lifelong ambition,” “roommate threatens existence,”
“student journal editor,” or “acquire darkened appearance.” Eight
of these, concern clusters, were constructed separately for each par-
ticipant based on his or her CDQ responses, in most cases masked
by avoiding using participants’ own wording. Four other word
clusters were drawn from a pool of other participants’ concerns
with veriﬁcation that they were not of concern to the particular
participant, and 72 were ﬁller clusters constructed to be formally
like the concern clusters. The mean range-corrected proportional
increase in skin conductance for intervals extending to 5 s after
the end of stimulus clusters was 0.525 for concern clusters, 0.273
for non-concern clusters, and 0.174 for ﬁller clusters. The differ-
ence between concern and non-concern clusters was signiﬁcant
with p < 0.025 and a Cohen effect size of 0.56. The difference in
skin conductance between ﬁller clusters and concern clusters was
signiﬁcant with p < 0.01.
Unfortunately, the experimenters subjectively suspected that
8 of the 19 Minnesota participants may have had at least some
inkling of the hypotheses of this study, although this was not
conﬁrmed by participants’ statements. In any event, the skin con-
ductance results for the 11 probably unaware participants were
weaker than for the possibly aware participants and, taken by
themselves, fell short of statistical signiﬁcance (p < 0.10, two-
tailed). This made it desirable to attempt a different kind of
research design using a thought-sampling procedure. Instead of
assessing arousal in response to goal-related and neutral cues
constructed by the investigators (which participants may have
recognized correctly as having been constructed for them indi-
vidually), Experiments 2 and 3 investigated what was happening
in participants’ consciousness as a function of skin conductance
measures. In Experiments 2 (158 German students) and 3 (24
German students), the signal tones to rate thoughts during elec-
trodermal measurement were sounded either when experimenters
observednon-speciﬁc (i.e., unelicited) skin conductance responses
(10 probes) or at control points (also 10 probes) in the absence of
such spontaneous electrodermal activity, in quasi-random order.
Experiments 2 and 3 differed only in the larger number of scales
in Experiment 3 on which participants orally rated their thoughts
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at each sampling point. In Experiment 2, they rated the presence
of a current concern (unﬁnished “activity or goal”), arousal, and
imagery (“imagination”) in their thought content. These ratings
were on a scale ranging from 0 (not present) to 5 (fully present).
The mean ratings for current-concern-relatedness were 2.18
after probes triggered by skin conductance responses and 1.88
after probes during electrodermally inactive periods (p < 0.001).
Ratings of perceived arousal differedmuch less (p< 0.05) between
these two sampling conditions and of imagination not at all. In
Experiment 3, the ratings that reached signiﬁcance at p< 0.05were
higher after probes triggered by skin conductance responses than
during quiescent periods for current-concern-relatedness and for
anxiety, and they were lower for presence of imagery. Together,
these ﬁndings indicate through electrodermal measures that inter-
nally generated goal-related cues are either preceded or closely
accompanied by emotional arousal. That the difference in rat-
ings of arousal was weaker than those of concern-relatedness may
indicate that the arousal is often not consciously experienced.
Also of interest in Experiment 3 was the rating variable for
“dormant concerns” (“any activity or goal you have not ﬁnished or
reached in the past which you are not pursuing currently”). Insofar
as ratings of the presence of dormant concerns in thought samples
differed by sampling conditions (p < 0.10), they were actually
lower during skin conductance responses than during quiescent
periods. This suggests that current goal pursuit, rather than just
having the goal in one’s past conceptual repertoire, is necessary for
arousal.
HEART RATE LEVELS AND THE FREQUENCY OF TASK-UNRELATED
THOUGHTS
Another investigation (Smallwood et al., 2004) found evidence of
substantially higher arousal as measured by heart rate for indi-
viduals who engaged in more frequent task-unrelated thoughts
(TUTs). Although this investigation did not assess the relatedness
of TUTs to individual participants’ goals or concerns, it is a fair
assumption from other evidence that their TUTs were so related.
Although the sample was small, the correlations between TUT fre-
quency and heart rate were substantial. For three task conditions
the ordinal correlations were 0.75 in a word-shadowing task (read-
ing without memorization) and 0.28 in a word-study task (with
memorization); the overall correlation for the combined tasks was
0.58. One possible implication is that goal-related thoughts during
TUTs are associated with emotional arousal.
EEG EVIDENCE ON LATENCY OF PROTOEMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO
EMOTIONALLY EVOCATIVE STIMULI: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTROL OF
ATTENTION
Although the studies above demonstrate an association between
emotional arousal and cues of one’s goals, theyprovideno evidence
regarding the temporal sequence of this association. However,
EEG evidence is at least suggestive, in the form of associations
between responses to emotionally evocative stimuli – both words
and pictures – and positive deﬂections in the EEG trace in a
band beginning at about 300 ms after stimulus onset (the P300
response). This nomological net is reviewed elsewhere (Klinger,
1996). Its implications are that the processing of emotionally
loaded material begins about a third of a second after stimulus
onset. Because of its association with the emotionality of stimuli
at a point when the arousal is not yet conscious, I have dubbed this
kind of response protoemotional.
In this view, the protoemotional response constitutes a ﬁrst
step in processing of stimuli; whether processing continues, and
whether it eventually engages other bodily systems, such as cir-
culatory, glandular, pulmonary, or intestinal activity, depends on
conditioned responses and cognitive assessments of the impor-
tance, valence, and expectancies of whatever it is that the stimuli
represent. Insofar as emotionally evocative stimuli are also goal-
related stimuli, having a goal – a current concern – controls much
of what it is to which people attend.
MOOD, MIND-WANDERING, AND RUMINATION
There is one more kind of association involving emotion.
There is evidence that inducing negative moods increases mind-
wandering, perhaps because it potentiates personal concerns
(Smallwood et al., 2009a). When internal cues are associated
with threat, they may set up a repetitive sequence of rumina-
tive thoughts. (For a full review of repetitive thought, seeWatkins,
2008.)
The ﬁndings described above provide a ready explanation for
ruminative sequences. For example, an individual is concerned
about one or more important goals, such as keeping a relation-
ship or a job, and feels anxious about the many details involved in
these, such as the many things necessary for keeping the other per-
son or the boss happy while meeting one’s own needs and desires.
With high enough values placed on these goals and subgoals, the
individual’s own thought stream provides a continuing source of
internal cues that trigger one after another of the individual’s emo-
tional reactions to, and self-generated thoughts about, the various
aspects of the goal pursuit. If this concern is more potent emo-
tionally than most of the person’s other concerns, the network
of reactivity is likely to keep the individual’s thoughts within the
domain of the highly valued concern, as each thought segment
triggers another related to the same broad domain or to related
domains, with plenty of repetition. Hence one ruminates.
Furthermore, it appears that negative moods tend to skew
mind-wandering toward past events (Smallwood and O’Connor,
2011; Smallwood et al., 2011). Once the person has extracted all
of the lessons offered by these past events, further repetition is
unhelpful, and the rumination is likely mainly to lower mood
even further. Individuals with personalities high in negative affect
are particularly vulnerable to this pattern. Apart from mulling the
past, the individual, under the pressure of prospective loss or fail-
ure, may already be somewhat depressed, and the emotional tone
of the ruminative sequences is likely to deepen that depression
even further (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
It is important not to confuse these ﬁndings with an impres-
sion sown by the title and summary of an article by Killingsworth
and Gilbert (2010), that mind-wandering as such lowers mood.
That is not what their data actually showed. Their partici-
pants rated 42.5% of their mind-wandering episodes as about
something “pleasant,” with mood then averaging slightly above
the overall mood average, roughly equaling mood when not
mind-wandering. They rated 31% of the remaining mind-
wandering episodes as about something “neutral,” with average
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mood slightly below overall average but above the mood scale’s
midpoint. Participants rated mood as sharply below overall aver-
age and below the scale midpoint only during the 26.5% of
mind-wandering samples that they characterized as about some-
thing “unpleasant.” Thus, only particular thought content, not
mind-wandering as such, was associatedwith substantially lowered
mood (cf. also Stawarczyk et al., 2012).
A similar result emerged from a conventional questionnaire
study (Mar et al., 2012) that found life satisfaction to be negatively
correlated with self-reported patterns of daydreaming about inac-
cessible people (for example, out of the person’s past or strangers)
but positively correlated with daydreaming about people with
whom the daydreamer was currently close. That is, the associ-
ation of daydreaming patterns with affect varied (signiﬁcantly
but weakly) with daydream content. There was no consistent
association with daydreaming frequency as such.
Killingsworth andGilbert (2010) also performed time-lag anal-
yses whose results found lower mood in samples obtained after
a mind-wandering episode than after a non-mind-wandering
episode, but these episodes were on average hours apart, some-
times separated by a night, which suggests that something other
than the fact of individual mind-wandering episodes accounted
for this result. Their ﬁnding is also inconsistent with the results
of another investigation that found no overall effect of mind-
wandering on mood 15 min later (Poerio, 2012).
PRINCIPLE 3: CONDUCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES INDUCE
GOAL-DIRECTED ACTION
When the individual is in a situation conducive tomaking progress
toward attaining a goal, the response to goal cues takes the form of
actions or operant mental acts that advance the goal pursuit. This
idea is intuitively obvious, but its elaborations become compli-
cated.Whether a person views a situation as conducive to pursuing
a particular goal depends on a decision process that takes into
account the anticipated relative gains and losses arising from a
particular course of action in comparison with alternative courses
of action possible in that situation. An elaborate research area
has grown up around this decision process, which one can gener-
ally subsume under Expectancy X Value theory in psychology and
Expected Utility theory in economics. This theory, together with
recent neuroscientiﬁc ﬁndings that support it, is brieﬂy reviewed
elsewhere (Klinger and Cox, 2011).
If the individual becomes actively operant in pursuing the goal,
the situation is transformed into one similar to experimental task
activity. Mind-wandering is then typically reduced, and activity in
the default-mode network is attenuated, a ﬁnding that originally
arose out of experimental manipulations leading to the discovery
of that network as one whose activity rises spontaneously and
regularly in the absence of work on a task (a“resting state”; Raichle
et al., 2001).
However, to clarify the relation of the default-mode network
to goal-directed action, this network becomes active more broadly
than simply during mind-wandering or simply in the absence of
operant activity. It is activated during states of unfocused exter-
nal attention (Stawarczyk et al., 2011b) or perceptual decoupling
(Smallwood, 2013a), when attention is turned away from per-
ceptual senses, regardless of whether the turning away is part
of a respondent sequence. Moreover, this activity cannot be
accounted for by task-related interferences or external distractions
(Stawarczyk et al., 2011b). In a compelling experimental dissec-
tion, Smallwood et al. (2013b) reported that degree of activation
of core regions of the default-mode network (medial prefrontal
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex) was associated with faster
RTs in simple laboratory tasks that required focusing on memory
(the numerical value of a previous stimulus) but was associated
with slower RTs when the task required focusing on current stim-
uli (whether the present number was odd or even). The important
point for present purposes is that the activated default-mode
network may facilitate an operant response that depends on an
internal focus, such as retrieval from memory.
Previous evidence using less focal behavioral activities is con-
sistent with these ﬁndings. For example, Spreng et al. (2010)
found activation of the default-mode network during autobi-
ographic planning, which entails both retrieval of memories
and imagining the future, thus turning attention inward, but
not during a visuospatial planning exercise, an adaptation of
the Tower of London puzzle, in which attention is turned out-
ward. Earlier, a meta-analysis by Spreng et al. (2009) had found
active default-mode components during autobiographic memo-
ries, prospection (imagining the future), navigation (imagining
one’s location and how to move within it), and theory of mind
(taking another person’s perspective). These results clearly sug-
gest that the default-mode network is activated during a variety
of perceptually decoupled mental activities. It thus appears that
although the respondent components of mind-wandering may
depend on the default-mode network, they are far from the only
activity supported by that network.
When tasks make large demands on processing, the necessary
shift of mental resources from the default-mode network to exec-
utive regions is harder to attain with advancing age (Persson et al.,
2007). Mind-wandering activity is also modulated in accordance
with the factors described below under Principle 5.
To sum up this section, under circumstances conducive to
doing something about one’s goals, mind-wandering declines but
the default-mode network on which it depends remains active in
relation to inner-focused mental activities, such as retrieval from
memory or imagining a future scenario. The operant thoughts and
actions that replace mind-wandering are, of course, directed at the
individual’s goals. Some of these may be intrinsically satisfying
ultimate goals, but others may have been imposed on the indi-
vidual by the need to satisfy other individuals or circumstances
that wield some control over access to the person’s intrinsically
satisfying goals, such as a partner or a war.
PRINCIPLE 4: WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES ARE UNFAVORABLE
FOR GOAL-DIRECTED OPERANT BEHAVIOR, ACTIVITY
BECOMES LARGELY MENTAL, AS IN MIND-WANDERING.
WHAT FOR?
When circumstances are unfavorable for goal-directed operant
behavior, whether in action or thought, the response to cues of
a goal remains largely mental, as in mind-wandering and dream-
ing, but still reﬂects the content of the goal pursuit or thematically
associated content. The evidence for the goal-relatedness of such
respondent mentation is discussed above under Principle 1 (e.g.,
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Klinger, 1978; Hoelscher et al., 1981; Nikles et al., 1998; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010a; Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a;
Schacter, 2012).
ZONING OUT: MIND-WANDERING WITH BLANK
META-AWARENESS
Although such respondent mental content is generally conscious,
in the sense that it is at least partly reportable in response to
sampling probes, memory for it is often short (median of 5 s
per content segment; Klinger, 1978) and it may occur without
current awareness. For example, when people were asked to indi-
cate whenever they were aware of having mind-wandered, those
reportsweremuch less frequent than themind-wandering thatwas
found to take place with experience-sampling probes (Schooler
et al., 2011). Furthermore, extent of activation in various brain
regions of the default-mode network differs somewhat accord-
ing to whether individuals are aware or unaware of their mind-
wandering.
One reason that people mind-wander much more than they
are aware of doing may be that mind-wandering and the meta-
awareness of doing so engage some of the same brain structures,
such as the anterior prefrontal cortex, so that when occupied by
mind-wandering these structures cannot also create awareness of
themind-wandering (Schooler et al., 2011). Thus, energy goes into
mind-wandering without the mind-wanderer being aware that it
is going on.
BENEFITS OF MIND-WANDERING
Why would our species have evolved such extensive mind-
wandering? Actually, this state of not thinking directedly
appears to confer a number of beneﬁts for cognitive functioning
(Christoff et al., 2011). This section reviews evidence regarding its
functions.
PLANNING FOR GOAL PURSUITS
First among these is the role of mind-wandering states in advanc-
ing people toward their goals. Thus, thought samples indicate
that the content of mind-wandering includes planning elements,
which strongly suggests it fulﬁlls a planning function (Baird et al.,
2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a), even though its components are
spontaneous and fragmentary.
CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING
Second, mind-wandering appears to promote creative problem-
solving that is productive toward attaining one’s goals. There
are numerous anecdotal reports of important creative insights
attained during states that foster mind-wandering (e.g., Klinger,
1990; Singer, 2009). Early on, Singer and Schonbar (1961) had
found that a psychometric, self-report measure of how much
graduate students in education daydreamed correlated 0.48 with
the degree of creativity the students displayed in their account
of an “actual daydream” and in a “spontaneous, original story”
that they wrote. Reviewing the challenges one faces, as in mind-
wandering, promotes the incubation of creative problem-solving
in a way that improves subsequent performance. Thus, interpos-
ing an opportunity formind-wandering (during an undemanding
task) between two administrations of Unusual Uses problems
leads to better subsequent performance in solving those prob-
lems on a second try than after interposing a demanding task that
discourages mind-wandering (Baird et al., 2012).
Consistent with these ﬁndings, the brain regions of the default-
mode network substantially overlap those that come into play in
the early stages of creative thinking about something, such as the
medial prefrontal cortex. However, creative thinking also eventu-
ally requires evaluationof one’s ideas,which involves other regions,
such as the lateral prefrontal cortex (Christoff et al., 2011).
MIND-WANDERING AND DELAY-DISCOUNTING
There are further likely beneﬁts of mind-wandering. It appears
that people whose minds wander more than others are also
likely to display more patience with receiving rewards and hence
make better decisions. Smallwood et al. (2013a) measured mind-
wandering with probes for TUTs during an undemanding or a
demanding task. Subsequently participants engaged in a “delay-
discounting” task. Delay discountingmeasures the extent to which
people settle for smaller immediate rewards rather than wait for
larger, delayed rewards. For example, in the study by Small-
wood et al. (2013a), participants were given a choice of receiving
€10 immediately or a larger reward (ranging from €12 to €50)
at from 1 to 180 days later. Considering only the undemand-
ing task, which permitted considerable mind-wandering, those
whose minds wandered more than others also were more likely to
choose one of the larger but later rewards than the small immediate
reward.
In this correlational design, it is impossible to establish causal
direction. Does tending toward more mind-wandering provide
more opportunity for reﬂection or more insulation from distract-
ing external stimuli, as Smallwood et al. (2013a) suggest, thereby
leading to sounder decisions? Or does a more restrained deci-
sion process or greater trust elicit more mind-wandering? Or are
both attributes attributable to some more fundamental property
of personality? In any event, mind-wandering is here associated
with making sounder choices.
MEMORY CONSOLIDATION DURING MIND-WANDERING
Finally, there may be a memory consolidation beneﬁt of “off-
line” waking thinking that is similar to, although weaker than, the
well-documented memory consolidation that takes place in sleep.
For example, Ellenbogen et al. (2007) trained participants on the
alleged rank order of six stimuli that were composed of different
color patterns (e.g., Pattern B > Pattern C). The training con-
sisted of learning the ordinal relationships between pairs of these
stimuli that were of adjacent ranks. Later, the participants were
given unanticipated tests of ordinal relationships between stim-
uli that were different by two ranks (“one degree of separation”)
or three ranks (“two degrees of separation”). This task required
participants to exercise inference – to extrapolate from what they
had learned during their training experience. With only a 20 min
interval after training, participants had little ability to perform
this extrapolation task. After 12 or 24 h, however, their perfor-
mance improved considerably. For the 12-h groups, improvement
was roughly similar for inferences across one degree of separa-
tion regardless of whether the time interval included a night’s
sleep. However, participants who slept during part of the assigned
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overnight 12-h interval performed better on inferences across
two degrees of separation than those who had been assigned the
daytime 12-h interval, who presumably stayed awake. It appears
that for the awake participants the opportunities for undirected,
respondent thought such as mind-wandering fostered the con-
solidation process, although not as well as in sleep. Christoff
et al. (2011) provide an extensive review of the relevant litera-
ture and conclude that “recent ﬁndings suggest that the off-line
processing that occurs during periods of rest is associated with the
kind of memory consolidation processes that occur during sleep”
(p. 264).
BENEFITS OF MIND-WANDERING DEPEND ON ITS CONTENTS
The way in which a person’s respondent mentation approaches
one’s challenges appears to make an important difference in goal-
attainment. Thus Gabriele Oettingen and her colleagues (e.g.,
Oettingen et al., 2001; Oettingen and Mayer, 2002) undertook an
extensive series of studies on how features of fantasies relate to or
inﬂuence subsequent reactions in imaginary or actual goal pur-
suits. These studies employed a variety of goals, such as ﬁnding
employment, study abroad, improved academic performance, and
interpersonal relationships. In some studies, participants wrote
down fantasy elements and in others their fantasies remained
purely mental. In both correlational and experimental designs the
results established that, relative to people’s expectancies of success,
fantasizing about both the motivating pleasant features of antic-
ipated goal attainment and also the practical steps and potential
obstacles on the way to goal attainment led to greater commitment
to their goals and better performance than fantasizing about only
the positives or only the negatives of their goal pursuits.
The fantasies in these studies were induced by the researchers’
instructions, including in some studies experimentally varied
instructions, and in that way they differed from internally gen-
erated spontaneous thoughts, as in mind-wandering. They nev-
ertheless represent participants’ self-generated content. It is not
unreasonable to extrapolate, subject to future conﬁrmation, that
insofar as the prospective fantasies of mind-wandering contain
elements that promote planning, people are at an advantage in
attaining their corresponding goals.
PRINCIPLE 5: MIND-WANDERING IS LIKELY TO THE EXTENT
THAT ONGOING ACTIVITIES LEAVE SOME MENTAL
RESOURCES UNMOBILIZED. WHAT CONDITIONS GOVERN IT?
The more an individual engages in mind-wandering, the greater,
presumably, will be the representation of the person’s broad
panoply of goals in his or her thought stream. The factors that
determine the amount of mind-wandering are therefore relevant
to determining the contents of waking thought. Hence the impor-
tance of Principle 5: spontaneous-seeming respondent responses
as in mind-wandering are more likely (1) the more that an indi-
vidual ismomentarilymentally unoccupied with ongoing tasks, or
(2) occupied with easy tasks that place fewer demands for operant
resources, and (3) the less that is at stake for the person in an ongo-
ing activity. Also, (4) focused perceptual activity, such as scanning
a room to ﬁnd someone, temporarily suppresses thought. Princi-
ple 5 has been well-supported in behavioral research, and recent
neurocognitive studies are beginning to provide reasons for it.
The probability of spontaneous-seeming respondent thought
is highest during relaxed periods, when the brain’s default network
predominates (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010a), or during sleep. After all, the default network
was discovered as a result of researchers in brain-imaging stud-
ies observing regularities in brain activity when participants were
between their assigned tasks (Raichle et al., 2001), and the mental
activity during those task-free episodes was found to be largely
mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007).
A GROUND-BREAKING INVESTIGATION
An early investigation (Antrobus et al., 1966) that obtained
thought reports after brief signal-detection trials established a
number of other conditions. First, the rate at which participants
had to make judgments and the difﬁculty of the task (detect a
tone of a particular frequency versus detect a change in frequency
from the previous tone) both signiﬁcantly affected reports of task-
irrelevant thoughts. That is, the more demanding the task, the less
minds wandered.
Second, when the investigators instituted money penalties of
differing sizes for missing target signals, higher penalties led to
fewer reports of task-irrelevant thoughts (This ﬁnding actually
applied only to themale participants, for reasons that are unclear).
Third, between sets of such trials in their Experiment 3 the
investigators (Antrobus et al., 1966) exposed half of the partici-
pants to a radio broadcast of mostly music that was ostensibly
interrupted by an (untrue) announcement that the Communist
Chinese had just entered the Vietnam war, which was then really
in progress, and that U.S. draft boards were calling up all eligi-
ble men (untrue at that time). Given the implications of such a
development for themale participants,many of whomwould have
been subject to the military draft, and for participants’ friends and
relatives, this procedure clearly instated or elevated a current con-
cern. The effect on the subsequent set of signal-detection trials
was clear: compared with the control group, strongly increased
rates of reported task-irrelevant thoughts. Later inquiry revealed,
unsurprisingly, thatmany of the TUTs by participants in the exper-
imental condition related to the impact on them of the supposed
entry by the Chinese into the war. Here the manipulation was
not of what was at stake in participants’ performance but rather
what was at stake in external events, which surely relegated task
performance to relative irrelevance.
Finally, Antrobus et al. (1966) reported that the rate at which
participants reported task-irrelevant thought steadily increased
over trials. This was presumably an effect of fatigue, or perhaps
also of boredom.
TASK DIFFICULTY AND MIND-WANDERING
Subsequent research has conﬁrmed these conditions that govern
the tendency for minds to wander. One prominent determinant,
as in Antrobus et al. (1966), is task difﬁculty, which can be opera-
tionalized as a baseline task of simply ﬁxating attention on a point
on a screen versus varying degrees of perceptual load or working
memory load.
Giambra (1995) found TUTs more frequent with less demand-
ing vigilance tasks. He reports on other experiments with similar
effects, but the difﬁculty of the reading tasks they used appears not
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to have affected the frequency of TUTs. Difﬁculty levels of texts
may affect TUTs differently than more controlled, brief task units.
Feng et al. (2013) found more TUTs with difﬁcult than with easy
texts and also worse comprehension. Itmaywell be that when texts
become sufﬁciently difﬁcult, readers have trouble maintaining the
stream of absorbing the text meaningfully, with correspondingly
more frequent lapses into mind-wandering.
One way to vary load without changing tasks is by giving
participants varying degrees of practice with a task. This is
the approach taken by Mason et al. (2007), who found mind-
wandering (operationalized as stimulus-independent thoughts
[SITs]) most frequent at baseline rest, less frequent with well-
practiced tasks, which are to some extent automatized by the
practice and hence require less conscious control than novel tasks,
and least frequent with novel tasks. Activity levels of the default-
mode network varied with the task conditions similarly to SIT
rates. These relationships between patterns of brain activity and
mind-wandering were conﬁrmed and extended by Christoff et al.
(2009), who combined the fMRI procedure with simultaneous
thought probes during a go/no-go task.
The investigation by Mason et al. (2007) also found signiﬁcant
correlations during well-practiced tasks between fMRI readings of
activation in six regions of the default-modenetwork and scores on
the daydreaming frequency scale of the Imaginal Processes Inven-
tory (IPI; Singer and Antrobus, 1972), a self-report psychometric
measure of the individual’s typical inner experience. With little
variation across the six recording sites, the mean of the mean
correlations was 0.58; the mean of the peak correlations was 0.72.
These strong correlations both validate the daydreaming frequency
scale of the IPI and establish the close association of the default-
mode network with mind-wandering, which is one form – most
likely by far the largest – of daydreaming. (The connection is close
but not exclusive. See above the work by Christoff et al. [2009],
Smallwood et al. [2013b], Spreng et al. [2010], and others.)
There were a number of partial precedents for these ﬁnd-
ings: SITs associated withmedial prefrontal cortex (McGuire et al.,
1996), similarity in activation patterns during rest and seman-
tic retrieval (Binder et al., 1999), increased task difﬁculty leading
(a) to increased deactivation of some regions associated with
the default-mode network (McKiernan et al., 2003) and (b) to
decreased self-reported TUTs (McKiernan et al., 2006). In each
case the investigators suggested that the stimulus-independent and
task-unrelated thoughts may represent the kind of self-generated
or self-oriented thoughts common in mind-wandering.
Forster and Lavie (2009) varied perceptual load, deﬁned here
operationally as, for example, detecting a letter on a screen sur-
rounded by letters that look similar to the target letter, a task that
requires close inspection of the various letters, versus letters that
look quite different from the target, in which the target letter is
easily discriminable. The greater the perceptual load required to
perform tasks, the less participants’ minds wandered.
Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010a) have shown that both reports of
spontaneous thought and activity in the default-mode network
are substantially greater in relatively passive states (ﬁxation on
cross-hairs) than during more demanding tasks (detecting subtle
visual ﬂickers on a screen). This investigation also found a number
of important features linking activity in various brain regions to
the content of spontaneous thought. Especially, activity in the
medial temporal lobe correlated with default-mode activity when
participants reported thinking about something in the past or the
future. This leads to the inference that the medial temporal lobe
relays long-termmemories to the default-mode network’s thought
stream.
Teasdale et al. (1995) examined the relationship of three com-
ponents of working memory to SITs (although stimulus inde-
pendence and task-unrelatedness are, from the standpoint of
self-ratings, virtually uncorrelated dimensions (Klinger and Cox,
1987–1988), both have been used by various researchers to oper-
ationalize daydreaming or mind-wandering). One component of
workingmemory is the“phonological loop,”whose relation to SITs
was assessed by having participants memorize sequences of digits
by speaking them versus having them simply repeat a set sequence
of digits without any need to remember them. As compared with
quiet conditions, both of these procedures signiﬁcantly reduced
the number of SITs by half or more.
In a second experiment, Teasdale et al. (1995) examined a sec-
ond component of working memory, the visuospatial sketchpad,
operationalized as tapping keys on a keyboard in speciﬁed orders.
Participants in all three conditions had to decidewhether displayed
sentences were silly. Compared with a quiet condition, condi-
tions in which they also tapped their ﬁngers more than halved the
number of their SITs.
A third experiment investigated the effects of having practiced
a task, which consisted either of tracking a point on a pursuit rotor
or memorization of digits. Practice permits some automatization
of task behavior and hence relieves the need for conscious control.
There were fewer than half as many SITs while performing novel
as compared with practiced tasks.
Finally, in a fourth experiment, Teasdale et al. (1995) examined
the role of central executive resources in frequency of SITs. They
did this not by counting SITs but by assigning a task of continu-
ously generating randomnumbers, whichwere recorded, and then
examining lapses from randomness in the 20 numbers generated
before a thought probe. They then compared these indices of ran-
domness according to whether the probe elicited a SIT or a report
of “not thought” (NT). On the assumptions that generating ran-
dom numbers is difﬁcult enough to make signiﬁcant demands on
central executive processes, and that central executive resources are
necessary for producing SITs, Teasdale et al. (1995) hypothesized
that lapses from randomness would be more frequent before SITs
than beforeNTs. They conﬁrmed this hypothesis, with a difference
of a bit less than half a standard deviation.
Teasdale et al. (1995) concluded that SITs require central execu-
tive resources, and that the suppression of SITs during the various
tasks results from competition for those resources. This formu-
lation is consistent with the generalization that mind-wandering
occurs less often during more demanding tasks. What it does not
explain is why, in the absence of task activity, the brain automati-
cally reverts to the default-mode network, and whymental activity
automatically reverts to mind-wandering, as the baseline, default
states of brain and mind.
McKiernan et al. (2003) varied three dimensions of task difﬁ-
culty: stimulus presentation rate, perceptual discriminability, and
short-term memory load, each at three levels that were considered
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 415 | 11
“fpsyg-04-00415” — 2013/7/11 — 14:42 — page 12 — #12
Klinger Goals, thoughts, dreams: basic principles
easy, moderately difﬁcult, and difﬁcult. The difﬁculty levels were
reﬂected in corresponding differences in accuracy and time on tar-
get, thus verifying the manipulation of difﬁculty. In all but one of
the tested regions, increased difﬁculty led to increased deactivation
of some regions subsequently associated with the default-mode
network. Even the easiest conditions produced some signiﬁcant
deactivation. McKiernan et al. (2003) attribute this effect to an
automatic shift of brain resources from the cognitive processes
active at “rest” to those necessary to perform the assigned tasks.
Besides the observations that mind-wandering was more fre-
quent during relaxed states or work on undemanding tasks,
under these conditions self-generated thoughts were more often
focused on the future than on the past (Klinger and Cox, 1987–
1988; Smallwood et al., 2009b, Smallwood et al., 2011; Baird
et al., 2011). Under more demanding conditions, this prospec-
tive bias disappeared (Smallwood et al., 2009b). Also, working
memory capacity has been reported inversely associated with
everyday mind-wandering during resource-demanding activities
(Kane et al., 2007), positively related to proportionally prospective
mind-wandering during an undemanding task (Baird et al., 2011),
but unrelated to proportionally prospective mind-wandering dur-
ing demanding tasks (McVay et al., 2013). In the latter condition,
perhaps the drain on working memory saps its availability for
building scenarios of the future.
MOTIVATION – WHAT THE PERSON HAS AT STAKE IN PAYING CLOSE
ATTENTION
With regard to the effect on mind-wandering of what people
have at stake, Kool and Botvinick (2012) examined the amount
of time participants spent on a demanding or an undemand-
ing task in sessions in which they could freely shift from one to
the other. Demanding-task trials, which, based on previous evi-
dence, presumably reduced the opportunity for mind-wandering,
were rewarded with candy pieces, whereas trials with undemand-
ing tasks were not rewarded at all. Participants were allowed to
switch back and forth between the two types of task within ses-
sions. In a second session 1–2 weeks later, some participants were
told that their candy “wages” had increased and others were told
that they had decreased. The time they spent with demanding
tasks decreased after a wage decrease and increased after a wage
increase. The fact that these participants chose some unrewarded
trials is consistent with having a need for freer mental activity, as
in mind-wandering, and the shift toward more unrewarded trials
when the wages for rewarded, demanding trials decreased indi-
cates that mind-wandering decreases when there is more at stake
in the assigned task.
Mind-wandering has a well-established inverse relationship to
a variety of performance measures (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2004;
McVay and Kane, 2012a,b; Smallwood, 2013b), including reading
comprehension (Smallwood et al., 2003, 2007, 2008; Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; McVay and Kane, 2009; Smallwood, 2011;
Mrazek et al., 2012). Unsworth and McMillan (2013) thought-
sampled TUTs and obtained laboratory measures of working
memory capacity and a number of self-report measures: motiva-
tion for the task, interest in the topic, and previous experience
with the subject matter. They found that, of these, motiva-
tion for the reading task was the strongest predictor (−0.61)
of the TUT measure of mind-wandering, and mind-wandering
was the strongest predictor (−0.58) of reading comprehension.
In combination with the ﬁndings of Kool and Botvinick (2012)
and the original ﬁndings of Antrobus et al. (1966), it is clear
that, unsurprisingly, mind-wandering gives way to sufﬁciently
important external demands.
When one speaks of goals, goal neglect, and the interfer-
ence of TUTs with performance, the reference is usually to
experimenter-assigned goals that are likely to be of limited impor-
tance to the experimental participants. As Antrobus et al. (1966)
found when they levied money penalties for inattention (missing
target signals), incentives affect TUT rates. It would be inter-
esting to investigate the relation of TUTs to working memory
capacity or executive attention, and to task performance, under
higher-incentive conditions. Would high-TUT participants then
be equally disadvantaged as they have been in the investigations
reported hitherto?
EFFECT OF TASK OR ACTIVITY DURATION
As Antrobus et al. (1966) found, the incidence of TUTs increased
with task duration. Smallwood et al. (2002–2003) reported a sim-
ilar effect for much briefer task periods, interrupting participants
after 30, 45, or 60 s with a thought probe. When participants’
tasks were relatively easy to perform, the rate of TUTs increased
as a function of duration. This effect did not occur with a task of
thinking up words that begin with a particular letter of the alpha-
bet, which requires sustained controlled effort. Other investigators
that have reported a similar increase in TUTs as a function of
task repetition or duration include Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010a),
Stawarczyk et al. (2011a, Experiment 1),McVay and Kane (2012a),
and Unsworth and McMillan (2013). None of these investiga-
tions obtained direct measures of fatigue or boredom, but it is
a reasonable inference that mental fatigue with repeated process-
ing in an operant task might temporarily deplete brain resources,
much as has been reported in the literature on ego-depletion (e.g.,
Baumeister et al., 2000; Baumeister, 2002; Vohs et al., 2013).
THE TUSSLE BETWEEN MIND-WANDERING AND ATTENTION TO THE
EXTERNAL WORLD
Mind-wanderingmay be the baseline, defaultmental state, but it is
in continuous competition with the need to process what goes on
beyond the individual brain. No species could survive without that
external attention. McKiernan et al. (2003) have shown with fMRI
analyses that a variety of task-related variables – stimulus presen-
tation rate, perceptual discriminability, and short-term memory
load – in each case contributed to deactivating the default-mode
network. They proposed that this happens by diverting attention,
which is a limited resource, toward the external task.
Nevertheless, the default-mode network apparently corre-
sponds to the true default mental state in the absence of demands
for operant activity by tasks and goals. An essential question is
the mechanism for switching between these two attentional ori-
entations. Spreng et al. (2010) proposed a three-network model of
how this happens: the default-mode network, the dorsal attention
network, and a frontoparietal control network. The ﬁrst two have
“an intrinsic competitive relationship” whereas the third serves
“as a cortical mediator linking the two networks in support of
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goal-directed cognitive processes” (Spreng et al., 2010, p. 303; con-
ceptually extended by Smallwood et al., 2012). That is, Spreng
et al.’s (2010) fMRI results showed the frontoparietal control net-
work tobe activatedduringboth autobiographical (inner-focused)
and visuospatial planning (in an adaptation of the Tower of Lon-
don game). That suggests that the frontoparietal control network
plays a key role in the switch back and forth.
A GREAT DEBATE
For some years now, there has been a lively, constructive debate
regarding this switching process. This debate has been most
recently summarized by Smallwood (2013a), who has also sug-
gested a resolution among four main viewpoints: the goal the-
ory of current-concerns (e.g., Klinger, 1971, 1975, 1977, 2009;
Klinger and Cox, 2011; and the sections above), decoupling from
perception (e.g., Smallwood, 2011, 2013a,b), executive control
failure (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, 2010, 2012a,b), and meta-
awareness (Schooler et al., 2011: becoming conscious of one’s
mind-wandering, a self-regulatory process). Smallwood proposes
separating explanations for the occurrence of mind-wandering
from explanations for the process of mind-wandering once it has
started. Of the four approaches, only the decoupling approach is
relevant to process, in the sense of the continuity and integrity of
a thought train. The other three approaches relate to the initiation
(“occurrence”) of a mind-wandering thought train. Therefore,
decoupling from perception complements rather than conﬂicts
with the other three as an account of mind-wandering.
Smallwood (2013a) is correct in stating that the current con-
cerns/goals theory is about the way in which thought segments
start and has little to say about how segments continue or end.
Decoupling, on the other hand, addresses a condition necessary
to protect an ongoing train of thought from disruption by per-
ceptual demands. Thus, it picks up the theoretical account where
current concerns theory leaves off. Furthermore, Smallwood views
executive control functions as a “domain-general resource” that is
active in organizing and regulating both externally oriented activ-
ity and mind-wandering. This view is consistent with the views
of such investigators as Teasdale et al. (1995) and Spreng et al.
(2010), although the latter view (and that of Smallwood et al.,
2012) has evolved from an executive control network to two net-
works: a dorsal attentional network that is “anticorrelated” with
the default-mode network (i.e., when activity levels in one network
rise, activity levels in the other fall), and a frontoparietal control
network that can join with either one of the other two, depend-
ing on task needs, to bestow processing priority. Spreng et al.
(2010) focused on mental planning activity. However, as already
indicated, mind-wandering, even if somewhat erratic, frequently
relates to planning.
The strong evidence for perceptual decoupling raises a fur-
ther question regarding the processes involved in protecting the
integrity of segments of behavior – that is, of relatively integrated
response sequences that lead from the decision to act (or the start
of a thought train) to the intended endpoint of the sequence
(see also Franklin et al., 2013; Smallwood, 2013b). That launch-
ing such a sequence instates an inhibition of interruptive factors
seems clear. External interruptions of on-going behavior before
some logical endpoint or pause “leads to visceral arousal” and
emotional upset (Mandler, 1964, p. 163). The entire literature
on emotional accompaniments of extinction of operant behav-
iors attests to this (e.g., Klinger, 1975, 1977). The expectation
that accustomed sequences of behavior will end as usual seems
ingrained in people from an early age. EEG evidence with event-
related potentials indicates that infants as young as nine months
reactwithN400deﬂections (negative deﬂections after 400mspost-
stimulus) when sequences they observe end unexpectedly (Reid
et al., 2009). Perceptual decoupling may, accordingly, be part of
a more extensive process that protects ongoing behavior (see also
Klinger, 1971, 2011, in regard to a meaning-complex theory of
response organization; also behavioral chunking, e.g., Perlman
et al., 2010).
McVay and Kane’s conceptualization (e.g., Kane and McVay,
2012; McVay and Kane, 2012b), on the other hand, features proac-
tive executive control that keeps people focused on their goal
pursuits, from which mind-wandering distracts. Indeed, mind-
wandering detracts from performance of many ongoing tasks
(Schooler et al., 2011). In an extensive individual differences inves-
tigation employing structural equation modeling, TUTs mediated
effects of executive attention and working memory capacity on
reading comprehension with a coefﬁcient of −0.44 (McVay and
Kane, 2012a). Executive control is anticorrelated with the default-
mode network (e.g., Buckner et al., 2008); mind-wandering thus
represents a transient “failure” of the executive control network
rather than a potentially adaptive switch to another network.
Smallwood (2010, 2013a) questions this executive-failure view
on a number of grounds. First, the content of mind-wandering is
internally organized, may be persistent, and hence probably also
requires support from an executive control system that supports
both attention to a task and the integrity of thought trains that
have wandered away from it. Second, mind-wandering interferes
with processing of both task-relevant and task-irrelevant cues,
suggesting a brieﬂy stable perceptual decoupling that redirects
attentional resources to the ongoing stream of thought and is to
that extent impervious to distraction from external stimuli. Third,
in that individual differences study of the relationship between
mind-wandering and reading comprehension (McVay and Kane,
2012b), measures of trait attention control and working mem-
ory capacity predicted performance, but after controlling for this,
TUTs still accounted for an additional 8% of the variance in com-
prehension errors, thus suggesting that mind-wandering affects
task performance beyond the role of (executive) attention control,
presumably because of perceptual decoupling that accompanies
mind-wandering (Smallwood, 2013a).
As indicated, perceptual decoupling can be considered appli-
cable to thought process (protecting the integrity of the thought
stream), whereas the three other approaches apply to initiation
of thought segments. In that case, it would appear that decou-
pling complements the other three rather than conﬂicting with
them. However, the relationship among them is more compli-
cated than that. Failure of executive control during an ongoing task
would represent the beginning of a mind-wandering episode, but
reassertion of executive control would require an intrusion on the
mind-wandering, breaking through the decoupling shield to refo-
cus on external reality – a recoupling of perception. To that extent,
these processes would be in conﬂict. As a further complication,
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if, as Smallwood (2013a) suggests, mind-wandering itself requires
executive resources, are there then two strands of executive control
that come into conﬂict with each other? Perhaps, but this seems a
bit unparsimonious.
One conceptual possibility is that momentary shifts in incen-
tives, in the form of actual or anticipated affect regarding the
directionof attention, control theperson’s executive processeswith
corresponding shifts between external perceptionor action and the
fostering of thoughts. The decision function could be similar to
that operating in choices among alternative actions (e.g., Knutson
et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2005). Rather than a failure of executive
control, this would entail a ﬂexible executive that moves attention
to whatever focus appears at themoment optimal not only for task
performance but also for brain refreshment and for all of the other
goals on the individual’s agenda. The model proposed by Spreng
et al. (2010), with a frontoparietal control network that ﬂexibly
joins with other networks to selectively empower their functions,
seems compatible with this view.
This debate is ongoing. With the latest published arguments
barely months old, one can expect further counterarguments and,
one would hope, eventual further investigations to clarify the
underlyingmechanisms for shifts in attentionbetween the external
and internal worlds.
MOTIVATION TO MIND-WANDER
There is reason to believe that mind-wandering is positively val-
ued, that people are motivated to engage in a certain amount of it.
The evidence already cited above that mind-wandering increases
with task duration could be taken as supportive of it having pos-
itive value but could also be interpreted as evidence of weakening
executive control (increased ego-depletion). However, the results
described above by Kool and Botvinick (2012) are harder to inter-
pret in this way. Given trial-to-trial choice of a highly demanding
computer-based task (work) or a task with minimal demands,
which would permit extensivemind-wandering, their participants
chose to spend some trials in the low-demand task, even though
all choices of demanding trials and none of the choices of low-
demand trials were rewarded. With increased levels of reward per
choice of work trial, but with no accompanying change in task dif-
ﬁculty or duration, the amount of time spent on the high-demand
tasks also increased. This latter ﬁnding rules out simply mental
exhaustion as an explanation for choices of the low-demand trials.
This raises the question: to what extent are people positively
motivated to spend time mind-wandering (i.e., under the sway of
the default-mode network)? Clearly, people are positively moti-
vated to pursue goals (by deﬁnition!), which must limit the
amount of time they spend mind-wandering. There is extensive
reason to believe that a sense that one’s life is meaningful depends
on having attractive, attainable goals and that this is necessary
for sustained mental health (Klinger, 1977, 2012). The absence of
such goals leads to boredom, depressed moods, excessive enter-
tainment, and substance use. People strive for a balance between
active goal pursuit and inner life such as ordinarymind-wandering
and imaginative daydreaming, which are themselves goal-related.
There are large individual differences in the amount of time that
people desire to spend in imaginative daydreaming (Singer and
Bonanno, 1990; Singer, 1966, 1975; Bigelsen and Schupak, 2011),
some valuing it as a resource for self-amusement and stimulation
and others eager to reduce or eliminate it but unable to attain a
daydream-free state.
If moving between inner-directed and outward-directed states
is a kind of automatic decision process, there must be a switch-
ing mechanism that employs some set of criteria for making the
switch. It would be interesting to investigate which brain regions
are involved and whether they include those identiﬁed with deci-
sions using Value × Expectancy criteria, as has been found in
previous studies of incentive choices (Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler
et al., 2005).
It may be that the human brain is designed to spend some of
its time processing and reprocessing its agenda of goals and the
person’s experiences that bear on those goals. I am unaware of
speciﬁc evidence regarding this, but there is suggestive evidence in
experiments by Borkovec et al. (1983), who instructed worriers to
spend a concentrated half hour of each dayworrying. This reduced
the self-reported percentages of their remaining hours per day
spent worrying. It would be interesting to examine whether time
periods immediately following intensely demanding work con-
tain more mind-wandering than during times following relaxed
periods or undemanding work. The results described above of
increasing mind-wandering with increasing task duration suggest
a likely outcome.
In any event, the processing and reprocessing that occurs in
mind-wandering acts as a useful continuing examination of the
state of one’s goal pursuits and the possibilities and resources for
enhancing them, as well as a remindermechanism that keeps goal-
related material fresh in long-term memory and alerts individuals
to upcoming goal-related demands for action.
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